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Abstract 
From Phase 3 (2013-20) of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme carbon-intensive 
industrial emitters will receive free allocations based on harmonised, EU-wide benchmarks. This paper 
analyses and evaluates the impacts of these new rules on allocations to key energy-intensive sectors. It 
exploits an original dataset that combines recent data from the National Implementing Measures of 20 
Member States with the Community Independent Transaction Log and ETS-installation NACE code 
data. The analysis reveals that free allocations to benchmarked sectors will be reduced significantly, 
though not excessively, in Phase 3. This reduction should both increase public revenues from carbon 
auctions and has the potential to enhance the economic efficiency of the carbon market. The analysis 
also shows that changes in allocation vary mostly across installations within, rather than across, 
countries. Lastly, the analysis finds evidence that the new rules will, as intended, reward installations 
with better emissions performance, and will improve harmonisation of free allocations in the EU ETS 
by reducing differences in allocation levels across countries with similar carbon intensities of 
production. 
Keywords 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), CO2 allowance allocation, Emissions-
performance benchmarking. 
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1. Introduction* 
As the world’s first international carbon market for controlling greenhouse gas emissions, the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) continues to be an important policy 
experiment. However, after eight years of operation, certain aspects of the scheme remain 
controversial. One of the most controversial issues has been the allocation of free emissions 
allowances to carbon-intensive industry. 
In Phases 1 (2005-07) and 2 (2008-12) of the EU ETS, over 90% of the initial allocation of 
European Emissions Allowances (EUAs) were allocated to installations free of charge, with allocation 
rates based on historical emissions (EC, 2003). These allocations were determined by each EU 
Member State under its own National Allocation Plan (NAP). Given Europe’s politics, the complexity 
of the task, and the short time-frame available, it can be argued that such a decentralised approach 
made practical sense in the early phases of the EU ETS (Ellerman et al., 2010). 
But this approach nevertheless led to controversial outcomes. Firstly, it allowed for the possibility 
of competitiveness distortions, since the flexibility granted by the ETS Directive led to different 
allocation rules being used in different Member States (Betz et al, 2004; Betz et al, 2006). Secondly, 
the NAP system led to significant over-allocations. For example, during Phase 1, non-combustion 
sectors of the EU ETS saw their average allocation range from 104.2% of actual emissions in the 
cement sector to 120.3% in the pulp and paper sector (Trotignon & Delbosc, 2008). The pre-recession 
allocations and emissions of Phase 2 in 2008 also saw a continuation of substantial over-allocations in 
key sectors (Pearson, 2010). This phenomenon gave rise to a number of questions being raised about 
the distributional equity, environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the NAP system of 
allocation (Betz et al, 2006; del Rio Gonzalez, 2006; Neuhoff et al, 2006; Burtaw et al, 2006). Indeed, 
Abrell et al (2011) produced econometric evidence suggesting that the marginal carbon price 
incentives to reduce emissions in the non-electricity sector had been weakened by the amounts of free 
allocation, thus reducing the economic efficiency of the scheme. While Pahle et al (2011) have 
presented evidence of distortionary effects of non-performance-based free allocation in the electricity 
sector.  
This paper therefore seeks to provide a first, detailed analysis of the changes in allocation induced 
by the new benchmark-based allocation rules, which have been put in place to address these concerns. 
A new dataset, which matches preliminary Phase 3 installation-level allocation data for 20 EU 
countries with CITL and sectoral NACE code data, is thus exploited to answer three questions which 
are directly relevant for evaluating the new allocation policy: How will the new rules affect the 
amount of free allocation that different industrial sectors and Member States will receive in Phase 3? 
To what extent does benchmarking change the distribution of allowance allocations and thus ETS 
compliance costs, both across and within Member States and across and within economic sectors? 
Thirdly, do these observed changes in free allocation reflect an improved harmonisation of allocations, 
based on the principles outlined in the revised ETS Directive (EC, 2009)? To our knowledge, only Clò 
(2010), Dröge & Cooper (2010) and Martin et al (2012) have attempted an empirical evaluation of the 
new benchmarking rules. This paper goes further than these previous papers, however, which focused 
on evaluating the decision rules for determining which sectors were deemed exposed to carbon 
leakage and therefore to higher free allocations.  
Section 0 begins with a brief explanation of some key features of the benchmarking rules. Section 0 
summarises several of the key features of the changes in allocations induced by benchmarking, and 
estimates several measures of their impacts on compliance costs in Phase 3. Section 0 then provides an 
                                                     
*
 A previous version of this paper has been published in the Working Paper Series of Les Cahiers de la Chaire Economie 
du Climat and CDC Climat Recherche. 
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econometric analysis in search of evidence that the observed changes in allocations described in the 
preceding section are consistent with the stated policy aims of benchmarking. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The new benchmarking rules 
To address concerns over the method of allocation of EUAs in Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS, the 
revised ETS Directive of 2009 laid out new principles governing initial allocations from Phase 3 
onwards. The majority of allowances would be allocated by auction, with 100% auctioning for 
electricity for all but the 10 “new” EU Member States, while free allocation to other sectors would be 
determined by harmonised Community-wide rules, using emissions performance benchmarks. The 
stated aims of the new benchmarking rules were two-fold: “to minimise distortions of competition 
within the Community” and “to ensure that allocation takes place in a manner that provides incentives 
for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficient techniques” (EC, 2009a). 
The basic formula that determines each installation’s allocation for each of its eligible products can 
be summarized as follows (EC, 2011)
 1
: 
                                (1)  
where        is the total free allocation that installation   receives for its product   in year  .     is 
the product emissions-intensity benchmark of product  . It is generally measured in tonnes of 
CO2e/unit of output, and is based on the average emissions intensity of the 10% most efficient 
installations in the EU ETS in 2007-08
2
.       is the reference historical activity (production) level 
of product   by installation  , with installations’ operators allowed to choose the highest value of the 
2005-08 and 2009-10 medians. The new free allocation formula thus seeks to compensate emissions 
compliance costs for industry only to the level of emissions consistent with the “best available 
technology”. It is in this way that the European Commission seeks to “provide incentives for 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficient techniques”, while also harmonising free 
allocation rules. 
However, several additional complexities can affect the amount ultimately allocated to each 
installation and these are relevant to the analysis and interpretation of the results presented here. First, 
        in formula (1) is an allocation reduction factor that is applied to a small minority of products 
that are not considered to be at risk of carbon leakage (cf. EC, 2010a). These products will see their 
free allocations reduced by a multiplier of 0.8 in 2013, which declines linearly to 0.3 in 2020. Second, 
       in formula (1) is a uniform, cross-sectoral correction factor that can be applied to ensure that 
the total free allocation will not exceed the maximum annual amount of free allocation as defined in 
Article 10a(5) of the ETS directive
3
. Third, where heat exchanges occur between two ETS 
installations, related emission allowances will now be allocated free of charge to the heat consumer, 
while allowances are allocated to the heat producer when the heat consumer only is not covered by the 
EU ETS. Fourth, with the exception of where waste gases are recaptured from steel production, or 
where there is highly efficient cogeneration of heat and electricity, the emissions for electricity that is 
auto-produced by an installation should be deducted from the amount of free allocation to reflect the 
principle of no free allocation for electricity production. Similarly, where electricity consumption and 
other fuel use is considered substitutable, a correction is made to the amount of free allocation. 
                                                     
1
 In some cases benchmarks for specific products cannot easily or practically be used and so hierarchy of fallback 
approaches is used, based firstly on heat and then fuel consumption benchmarks and, if these are not possible, historical 
process emissions x 0.97 are used. 
2
 Where the best 10% of installations emissions intensity could not be gauged, fallback approaches were used based on 
best available technology literature. 
3
 For more details on these factors, see (Lecourt, 2012). 
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Finally, regardless of an installation’s original historical activity level (HAL), large changes to its 
production capacity accompanied by “significant” changes in activity can trigger changes in free 
allocation
4
. 
3. Free allocation changes from Phase 2: evidence from the Phase 3 NIMs 
3.1 Data description 
This analysis uses EU ETS installations compliance data from the CITL for the period 2008-11. These 
data were matched with the preliminary annual free allocation data for each installation for the period 
2013-20 as reported in the National Implementation Measures (NIM) of 20 Member States. Missing 
are Belgium, Hungary, Malta, Lithuania, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Latvia. 
Since the changes in allocation levels to new entrants in Phase 3 were not able to be calculated, this 
paper ignores the effects of the benchmarking rules on new entrants. Excluding new entrants, the 
aviation sector, installations which had left the EU ETS in Phase 3, and installations which could not 
be matched with either a CITL installation code or a NACE code, left a sample of 7149 installations 
which together accounted for 1.46 billion tonnes of CO2 or approximately 80% of EU ETS emissions 
in 2010 (CITL, 2011). Of these, 4174 installations were identified by their NACE code as non-
electricity installations and thus subject directly to benchmarking. Of these 4174 installations, 329 
specializing in the chemicals and non-ferrous metals sector were not included in the analysis since 
these sectors have had their EU ETS perimeter change significantly between Phases 2 and 3 and hence 
changes in allocation could not be attributed to benchmarking alone.  
3.2 Aggregate Phase 3 free allocation changes across Member States and economic activities 
Free allocations to benchmarked sectors will fall significantly in Phase 3. For our sample of over 4000 
benchmarked installations passing from Phase 2 into Phase 3, the aggregate decline in free allocation 
will be 20.6% on average over Phase 3 (Figure 1), before taking account of the possible uniform linear 
adjustment factor (it was yet to be announced at the time of writing). 
Figure 1. Free allocation changes in benchmarked sectors in Phase 3 by Member State 
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 Increases in production capacity greater than 15% are eligible for consideration of an adjustment in the installation’s 
HAL. If production activity drops by 50-75% compared to the initial activity level, the baseline HAL used to calculate 
future free allocations will fall by 50%. If activity falls below 90%, free allocation will be ceased. This too can affect the 
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Note: Figures exclude the chemicals and non-ferrous metals sectors since the perimeter of the ETS has changed for these 
activities in Phase 3. 
The changes in allocation will also vary across Member States, with some countries seeing relatively 
small declines or increases, while others see falls of between -30 to -47% (cf. Figure 1). However, one 
must be careful about jumping to the conclusion that this illustrates the relative “winners” and “losers” 
under the new system, since a number of factors are ignored here. For example, these allocation 
changes are based on the difference between the average annual free allocation in Phase 2 versus that 
of Phase 3. So countries which tended to be more generous with their allocations to industry in Phase 
2 might therefore be expected to witness bigger declines under the harmonised rules and vice-versa. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence of significantly declines across almost all 20 Member States
5
. 
The declines in free allocation are generally quite uniform across sectors (Table 1). With the 
exception of what we define here as “other sectors”, which includes a large number of sub-sectors not 
deemed exposed to carbon leakage and therefore facing a larger reduction factor on average, all of the 
declines fall in the relatively narrow range of -13 to -24%. Since many sectors were over-allocated 
allowances at the beginning of Phase 2, a large share of the decline appears to offset excess historical 
allocations. For example, the pulp and paper sector sees a 22% surplus largely offset by a 21% decline 
in allocation. The reductions in aggregate sectoral allocations induced by benchmarking therefore do 
not seem to be “excessive” for these sectors, although they will certainly reduce over-allocations and 
increase net compliance costs at the margin for several sectors. The dispersion of installations’ 
allocation changes around the median installation’s decline is generally quite wide, which implies that, 
as expected, benchmarking will redistribute allowances significantly within sectors. 
Table 1. Percentage change in allocation by sector 
  
Cokery 
Refined 
petrol 
products Glass 
Ceramics 
and brick Cement Lime 
Pulp 
and 
paper 
Iron 
and 
Steel 
Other 
sectors 
Aggregate Net 
Position 2008
µ
 
-16 -1 +9 +35 +11 +15 +22 +29 +13 
Aggregate 
allocation change† 
-17 -24 -24 -16 -13 -19 -21 -13 -37 
Median allocation 
change* 
-6 -14 -21 -17 -11 -18 -22 -11 -33 
Dispersion of 
allocation changes^ 
25 26 19 28 9 18 1331 82 99 
µCalculated as (allocation – emissions)/emissions in 2008 in the sector, †Refers to the total aggregate reduction in allocation 
in the sector, *Refers to the median reduction in allocation of installations in the sector, ^Refers to the average distance from 
the median allocation reduction of installations in the sector 
Table 1 also indicates that declines in allocations for most sectors are larger than the 14% decline in 
the emissions cap from the beginning to the end of Phase 3. This implies that the introduction of 
benchmarking leads to larger reductions in initial free allocations than if the European Commission 
had simply decided to reduce allocations according to a linear reduction factor equivalent to the cap on 
emissions. Figure 2 shows that, especially at the front end of Phase 3, the benchmarks allocations will 
be significantly stricter on aggregate than such a baseline scenario. On average the difference between 
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 Sweden’s unusual outcome is a result of now Union-wide allocation rules that has forced Sweden to allocate free 
allowances to installations of the electricity, gas, steam and hot water sector that were not allocated in Phase 2 under 
Sweden’s Phase 2 NAP, while Austria’s result appears to reflect capacity changes for installations taking effect in Phase 
3. 
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the two scenarios is 8.7% of the baseline allocation. This suggests that the benchmarks generate a 
significantly more stringent amount of allocation to the main benchmarked sectors than if free 
allocation had continued on a pathway extrapolated from the Phase 2 NAP allocations. Under 
benchmarking, an additional 670 million EUAs would be auctioned rather than allocated for free.  
Figure 2. Number of allowances allocated to main benchmarked sectors* under Benchmarking 
vs. a hypothetical linear allocation reduction scenario from NAP2s 
 
Main BM sectors: Pulp and paper, steel, coke, refining, cement, lime, ceramics, glass, and ferrous metals production.  
3.3The distribution of allocation changes 
The preceding sub-section showed that changes in allocations from Phase 2 to Phase 3 are found to 
vary substantially within individual sectors. Figure 3a provides further detail on this aspect of 
benchmarking’s impact. The flat line inside each box represents the median installation’s allocation 
change, the outer limits of the boxes represent the second and third quartiles, the black moustache-
lines show the portion of installations falling inside 1.5 standard deviations of the median, while the 
crosses represent those installations lying outside these ranges. Figure 3b removes the first and last 
vigintiles (10% of the sample is withdrawn) to more clearly see the distribution for the majority of 
installations.  
The sectoral distributions show that, for each of the main benchmarked sectors, the installations in 
the first three quartiles (75% of installations) generally undergo an allocation reduction. Upper 
quartiles have a larger range in allocation changes, mostly due to a large number of installations with 
small levels of allocation in Phase 2. Overall, it can be seen that that the benchmarking rules will lead 
to a substantial redistribution of allowance allocations within sectors. 
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Figure 3. (a: left, b: right). Distribution of inter-phase allocation changes at the installation level 
(allocation change expressed as a fraction of Phase 2 allocation on y axis) 
 
These redistributions across installations raise the question of whether the variance is mostly due to 
differences across or within individual Member States. Comparing both inter- and intra-Member State 
distributions in allocation changes shows that intra-Member State variance accounts for most of the 
total variance across installations. Table 2 decomposes the spread between each installation and the 
sectoral average into a spread between the installation and its national average and the remaining 
spread between the installation and the sectoral average. The results indicate that while some 
redistribution of allowances will occur across Member States, this redistribution is generally small 
compared to redistributions within Member States in most sectors. This result makes intuitive sense 
when one considers that allocations in Phase 2 were often based on a range of different fuel-emissions 
benchmarks- and load-factors, which sought to reduce the dispersion of cost impacts across 
installations within countries and that these rules have now been replaced with common rules for all 
installations in each sector. Interestingly, this raises the possibility that carbon-cost competitiveness 
impacts induced by the new allocations could be felt more intensely in terms of intra-country 
competition than inter-country competition.  
Table 2. Decomposition of the installation allocation change variance of benchmarked sectors 
 
Pulp and 
paper 
Cokery 
Refined 
petroleum 
products 
Glass 
Ceramics 
and bricks 
Cement Lime 
Iron and 
steel 
Inter-country 11% 44% 27% 9% 16% 26% 26% 10% 
Intra-country 89% 56% 73% 91% 84% 74% 74% 90% 
3.4 Estimating net compliance cost changes 
The analysis provided in Figure 4 offers estimates of EU sectoral expected net positions based on the 
NIM allocations under two hypothetical scenarios. The “High emissions” scenario refers to a situation 
in which each installations average annual Phase 3 emissions are equivalent to the reference historical 
activity level (HAL) as defined by the benchmarking rules. Equivalently, we define a “Low 
emissions” scenario in which we assume that average annual emissions remain at their 2011 levels for 
all installations Phase 3, since 2011 represents a low point in EU ETS emissions. For simplicity the 
effects of Phase 2 allowances banked into Phase 3 are ignored. 
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If the HAL-year emissions are a reliable guide to average annual Phase 3 emissions, then the 
sectors listed in Figure 4 would hold a net deficit position, with the exception of iron and steel and 
ceramics and brick. Hence the benchmarking rules would imply a small to medium level of “ambition” 
for most of the main benchmarked sectors.  
Figure 4. Sectoral net positions in 2008 vs. benchmarking under two emissions scenarios 
 
^Refers to the total EU20-wide sectoral net compliance position. 
Furthermore, for many sectors benchmarking would, under the HAL emissions scenario, reduce the 
average differences in net positions across countries in several sectors. The average distance of 
countries from the sectoral median across all of these sectors would be 8.5% in Phase 3 versus 9.7% in 
2008 (see Figure 5). This suggests that rather than increasing the gaps in the degree of free allocation 
compensation levels to different countries within sectors, benchmarking could potentially reduce 
them.  
Figure 5. Comparison of aggregate net compliance positions in 2008 vs HAL scenario 
 
Note: percentages refer to aggregate net position in 8 key sectors identified above. 
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A change from the High emissions scenario to the Low emissions scenario makes a significant 
difference to the expected sectoral net positions. This reflects the strong impact of the deterioration in 
European manufacturing production since 2009 and hence beyond the period which most installations 
use to determine their HALs. However, the fact that depressed industry emissions levels may lead 
some sectors as a whole to have a net neutral or even positive compliance position during Phase 3 does 
not mean that benchmarking will impact all installations in these sectors the way. Table 3 shows that 
even under the low emissions scenario, eight of the nine key sectors would see a higher share of 
installations needing to either purchase or draw down on banked allowances to be in compliance than 
in 2008. This share also rises by 11% or more for four out of the nine sectors. Thus, despite the 
economic downturn having reduced emissions, the benchmarks nevertheless impose a greater degree 
of compliance stringency on installations in these sectors than the NAP2s did.  
Table 3. Summary of installation level expected net positions under two emissions scenarios. 
  2008 LOW HIGH 2008 LOW HIGH 2008 LOW HIGH 
  Pulp and paper Coke Refined petrol. products  
Percentage < 0^ 31% 56% 65% 24% 25% 63% 41% 59% 77% 
Median installation* 10% -7% -15% 9% 29% -5% 2% -12% -20% 
  Glass Ceramic and brick Cement 
Percentage < 0 37% 67% 81% 14% 17% 64% 22% 24% 83% 
Median installation 5% -8% -15% 27% 49% -6% 8% 17% -8% 
  Lime Iron and steel Other sectors 
Percentage < 0 22% 33% 66% 29% 28% 50% 24% 68% 78% 
Median installation 15% 10% -6% 8% 16% -1% 15% -33% -43% 
^Percentage < 0 refers to the percentage of sampled installations in the sector whose emissions either were or would be 
greater than their free allocation under the relevant scenario. 
*Median installation refers to the median (estimated) net position of the sampled installations in that sector. 
4. Explaining differences in changes in allocations across Member States 
This section estimates a simple econometric model that seeks to identify whether the observed changes 
in allowance allocations can be explained by the factors which one would expect if allocations are 
being made consistently with benchmarking’s main policy objectives (i.e. rewarding improved 
performance and improving harmonization). Encouragingly, there is evidence in the NIMs of an 
improved harmonization of allocations across the EU based on observable proxies for emissions 
performance. 
4.1 Data and econometric specification 
Before attempting to evaluate the role of different variables in explaining the observed variations in 
free allocation changes, a decision is required about what level of aggregation to examine. 
Unfortunately, pan-European data on individual installation characteristics which could explain 
installation-level changes in allocation (e.g. measures of installation energy efficiency, carbon 
intensity of production, electricity consumption, etc) were not available at such a disaggregated level. 
Nevertheless, these data could only be constructed from available sources at the country and sector 
level. Combining these data with allocation aggregates provided by the NIM and CITL databases 
allowed for the estimation of the impact of country-sectoral level factors on allocation changes for 
three sectors: steel, cement and pulp and paper production. Despite their limitations, these data still 
provide preliminary evidence that the benchmarking rules are (re)allocating allowances in a way that 
appears to be consistent with the primary goals of the policy.  
The impact of emissions-performance benchmarking on free allocations in EU ETS Phase 3 
9 
To identify the role of individual factors, the following fixed-effects regression model was 
specified:  
ΔALLOCij   =   β1CO2IntFuelij   +   β2CO2IntProcij   +   β3NetPos08ij   +  β4ElecConsij            
+    β5CLExpij   +  β6EIij   +   FEi   +   εij 
∆ALLOCij is the percentage change in average annual free allocation to sector i in country j (“country-
sector pair ij”) in moving from Phase 2 to Phase 3. All else equal, country-sector pairs with higher 
(lower) CO2 intensities should see their free allocations decline more than others if the benchmarking 
rules are genuinely encouraging emissions performance through higher relative allocations, as 
intended. Thus, the variable CO2IntFuelij is included as a measure of the relative carbon dioxide-
intensity of the primary fuel mix consumed by country-sector pair ij in tCO2/toe. Similarly, 
CO2IntProcij represents the relative carbon emissions-intensity of country-sector pair ij’s process 
(non-energy-related) emissions, in tCO2e/tonne of production; while EIij is the energy intensity, in 
toe/tonne of output, of the country-sector pair ij. These data were constructed based on Enerdata’s 
ODYSSEE Energy Indicators database and the IEA’s WDS World Energy Statistics database.  
In addition several control variables are included. NetPos08ij is a proxy for the extent to which 
country-sector pair ij can be considered to have been over- or under-allocated in Phase 2. To control 
for the effects of the severe drop in industrial production in 2009 and thereafter, we use the ratio of 
allocation to verified emissions in 2008 as reported in the CITL. ElecConsij represents the extent to 
which country-sector pair ij consumes electricity instead of other fuels in its primary energy supply. 
This is included to control for the effect of benchmarking rules on allocations for electricity 
production and consumption, as explained above. The data are also based data from the IEA Energy 
Statistics WDS Energy Statistics database. CLExpij is a measure of the extent to which country-sector 
pair ij is composed of installations which produce products that are considered to be exposed to carbon 
leakage (and hence eligible for 100% allocation of the benchmarked amount). It is calculated from the 
NIMs data by observing the extent to which a given installation’s free allocation diminishes over 
Phase 3.  
To control for sector-specific differences in allocations, which were identified using a Breusch-
Pagan test, sectoral fixed effects were included (FEi). A Hausman test also indicated that since these 
effects were correlated with the explanatory variables, fixed effects was the most conservative 
estimation option for ensuring robustness of our estimates (cf. Annex).  
Compiling a panel dataset using three data sources meant that data for some variables were missing 
for some countries. Three observations were also identified as being “influential” outliers using Dfbeta 
tests and were removed from the final estimations (cf. Annex). This left a final unbalanced panel of 41 
observations which was used for estimation. 
Post-estimation analysis of the model errors showed that the estimated residuals were 
approximately normally distributed and provided little evidence of heteroskedasticity (cf. Annex). 
4.2 Regression results 
Encouragingly, the results generally correspond with what should be expected if the benchmarks were 
being implemented consistently with the stated aims of the Benchmarking Decision. The coefficient 
estimates for CO2IntFuelij are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels across all 
five estimated specifications. The coefficient estimates for CO2IntProcij are both negative and 
statistically significant at a 90% in the central specification (i.e. model 4) and seemed to be robust to 
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alternative specifications. Even when the model is expanded to include further variables, the 
coefficient estimates remain statistically significant at >90% on the one-sided test
6
. 
These two results imply that, all else equal and across the cement, steel and pulp and paper sectors, 
the more CO2-intensive is a Member State’s primary fuel mix or its (chemical) production processes, 
the more it tends to see its free allocation for that sector reduced in Phase 3. This is consistent with the 
qualitative result that benchmarking was intended to deliver since it implies that Phase 3 allocations 
are “correcting” the allocations in Phase 2 for excess allocations not related to emissions performance. 
This is therefore evidence that the Benchmarking process does appear to be rewarding (penalizing) 
better (poorer) emissions performers on average throughout the EU more than the NAP2s did.  
Table 4. Regression results 
Coefficient 1. 2. 3. 4.  5. 
CO2IntFuel -0.060
b
 
(0.034) 
-0.086
a
 
(0.034) 
-0.094
a
 
(0.037) 
-0.084
a
 
(0.036) 
-0.090
a
 
(0.039) 
CO2IntProc    -0.231
b
 
(0.123) 
-0.185
c
 
(0.140) 
NetPos08  -0.22
a
 
(0.087) 
-0.241
a
 
(0.093) 
-0.285
a
 
(0.093) 
-0.250
a
 
(0.108) 
ElecCons   -0.129 
(0.239) 
-0.291
c
 
(0.247) 
-0.431
c
 
(0.318) 
EI     -0.278 
(0.364) 
CLExp     -0.325 
(1.660) 
Descriptive 
Statistics  
 
R
2
 (within) 0.08 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.31 
F-statistic 3.02 5.04 3.39 3.60 2.40 
Prob > F 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 
Observations 41 41 41 41 41 
a
Statistically significant at 95% level, 
b
Statistically significant at 90% level
 c
Statistically significant at 90% level 
based on a one-sided test only. 
Moreover, the NetPos08ij variable was statistically significant at high levels and negatively signed. 
This implies that, all else equal, a country-sector pair with a higher allocation level relative to its 
actual emissions in 2008 tended to see a bigger drop in free allocation in Phase 3 under benchmarking. 
This result is interesting for what it says about the behavior of Member States in allocating allowances 
in Phase 2 compared to what they are required to do now under benchmarking. Specifically, it 
indicates that aggregate sectoral allocations in Phase 2 were not simply based on historical emissions 
but rather included some degree of country-specific heterogeneity. Indeed, the regressions performed 
                                                     
6
 It can be safely assumed a priori that CO2IntProcij is not positively correlated with changes in allocation. Moreover, the 
fact that this variable is not as strongly statically significant as those for CO2IntFuel seems likely to be explained by the 
fact that all the CO2IntProc observations for pulp and paper are zeros, which implies less variation to enable parameter 
identification. 
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above effectively controlled for both emissions intensity and production levels 
7
 – as well as other 
potential biases such as electricity production and sectoral effects. Yet they still found that some 
additional free allocation decline from Phase 2 to Phase 3 was left to be explained by the NetPos08ij 
variable. This implies that Phase 2 saw excess allocation in the sampled sectors over and above what 
was due on a historical emissions basis and that the benchmarking rules correct for this (by subjecting 
all countries to the same rules) in Phase 3. This is evidence that the benchmarking system appears to 
be achieving one of its key goals of reducing differences in free allocation and thus possible 
competitiveness distortions that are not related to differences in emissions performance by 
harmonising EU allocations according to the benchmarks.  
The regression results also provide some weak evidence that sectoral electricity consumption to 
total energy consumption rates are negatively correlated with cross-country sectoral declines in free 
allocation. This could plausibly reflect the fact that countries with higher electricity use in these 
industries see bigger declines in free allocation on average, as per the benchmarking rules which insist 
on no free allocation where electricity consumption and combustion fuel use are substitutes. However, 
more data would be required to obtain greater certainty concerning this hypothesis.  
Insufficient statistical evidence was found to conclude that the energy intensity (EIij ) variable is a 
significant explanator of differences in free allocation changes across Member States. While this may 
seem counter-intuitive, benchmarks are based on CO2-intensity of production rather than energy 
intensity of production, so a priori one should not necessarily expect as strong a correlation between 
emissions performance and energy intensity. Moreover, to the extent that the two are correlated, it 
seems plausible that relative energy intensity may not matter as much in explaining relative 
performance across Member States, which is the limitation of this analysis which the current data 
restrict us to. Analysis with a richer intra-country dataset would be required, however, to be confident 
of such conclusions.  
Insufficient evidence was also found to conclude that the relative exposure to carbon leakage of 
each country’s sector-specific product mix is a statistically significant factor in explaining differences 
in changes in free allocation across Member States. This result was believed to follow from a lack of 
variation in the sample, since the vast majority of observations for the three examined sectors 
contained a value of 100%-exposed to carbon leakage, with others very close to 100%.  
4.3 Robustness and data limitations 
A few caveats are required on the interpretation of these regression results. Firstly, the estimates refer 
to cross-country estimations (for three specific sectors). Consequently, the coefficient estimates cannot 
therefore be interpreted as explaining the impact of the observed variables on intra-country differences 
in allocation changes across installations or sectors.  
Secondly, there is a likelihood of some measurement error. The best that could be done with the 
available data was to match country-sector pair allocation data (constructed based on very specific 
products produced by each installation) with a more aggregated measures of national-sectoral energy 
and CO2 consumption. However this measurement error reduces the precision of the estimation (this 
helps to explain the relatively low R-squared (0.30) of the model).  
Thirdly, at least three interesting variables could not be controlled for due to data availability 
problems. Country-specific effects could not be robustly for due to the small sample size, while two 
other variables – namely the level of cross-installation-boundary heat flows and capacity changes – 
could not be controlled for due to lack of data. While there is not a strong reason to believe that the 
absence of these two variables biases the estimates, these variables might be expected to help explain a 
                                                     
7
 Historical production is controlled for implicitly since historical activity is used to calculate Phase 3 allocation, which is 
in turn used to calculate the dependent variable.  
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significant share of the variation in allocations across countries’ sectors and thus increase the precision 
of the estimates. Their absence is thus another caveat on these results (and also helps to explain the 
low R-squared of the model).  
5. Conclusions 
The introduction of emissions performance benchmark-based allocations in Phase 3 of the EU ETS 
will significantly change the manner in which free CO2 allowances are allocated to emissions-
intensive industry in Europe. The move to benchmarking implies a significant fall in free allocations to 
benchmarked sectors compared to allocations of Phase 2 and compared to the decline in the ETS-wide 
emissions cap. The estimates presented here indicate that the overall reductions in allocations will 
leave at least an additional 670 million allowances available to be auctioned by public authorities 
compared to a hypothetical continuation of the NAP allocations. If previous empirical literature (cf. 
Abrell et al, 2011) is correct, these reductions in free allocations could potentially improve the 
environmental effectiveness and efficiency of the EU ETS – although this remains to be confirmed by 
further research.  
The above analysis shows that benchmarking entails substantial redistributions of emissions 
allowances and relative compensation levels across installations, with some receiving more but with 
most receiving less than in Phase 2. The vast majority of this redistribution is found to be between 
installations within the same sectors and Member States. This suggests that any resulting carbon-cost 
competitiveness effects from benchmarking could potentially be stronger across different installations 
within countries, than across different countries.  
Lastly, a simple regression analysis also indicates that a significant portion (at least 30%) of the 
cross-country differences in the changes in sectoral free allocation in Phase 3 is consistent with the 
two main stated aims of the benchmarking approach in the revised ETS Directive (EC, 2009a): firstly, 
to reward more efficient emissions performance through higher allocations; and secondly to improve 
EU-wide harmonisation of allocations.  
Further work with more complete data on ETS installations will be required to further our 
understanding of impacts of the benchmarking rules at installation level. Nevertheless, the preliminary 
evidence provided here is consistent with the EU-policy makers stated aims in designing phase 3 
allocation rules.  
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7. Annexes 
7.1 Count of installations from each Member State included in the final database 
 
Note: Electricity installations were defined as those having a 3-digit NACE code 40.1 
7.2 Data and results of econometric tests  
Changes in Phase 3 free allocation vs. relative CO2-intensity of fuel mix by sector 
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Dfbeta Test Results for determining Influential Outliers of the dependent variable: 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test for presence of random effects  
Null Hypothesis, H0: Var(u) = 0, Test:  
Χ2(1)  5.03 
Prob> Χ2(1) 0.0249 
Conclusion: Strong evidence that sectors have different intercepts 
Hausman test for the consistency of random effects with fixed effects 
H0 = difference in coefficients is not systematic 
Χ2(4) 65.10 
Prob> Χ2(4) 0.0000 
Conclusion: Strong evidence of systematic differences in coefficients between the two models. Hence, 
random effects cannot be safely used.  
Shapiro-Wilk Test for normally-distributed residuals: 
H0: Residuals of specification 4. in Table 4 are normally distributed. Test:  
Variable Observations w v z Prob>z 
Residuals 41 0.97053 1.187 0.362 0.35875 
Conclusion: Insufficient evidence to reject H0 
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Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects regression model 
H0: σ(i)
2 
= σ2 for all i (i.e. there is no groupwise heteroskedasticity in errors of specification 4 in Table 
4. Test:  
Χ2(3)  5.14 
Prob> Χ2(3) 0.1617 
Conclusion: Insufficient evidence to reject H0  
7.3 Sectoral distribution of installations’ expected net positions for low (left) and high (right) 
emission scenarios (allocation change expressed as a fraction on y axis) 
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